John Butterworth is a Security Researcher at The MITRE Corporation who currently specializes in Intel firmware security. In 2012 he co-authored the whitepaper, "New Results for Timing-Based Attestation," which used timing based attestation to detect Windows kernel hooks. This research was presented at DEF CON and the 2012 IEEE Symposium on Security and Policy. In 2013, he and his colleagues authored "BIOS Chronomancy: Fixing the Static Root of Trust for Measurement," which proposed using Timing-Based Attestation during the BIOS boot process to resolve critical problems which they had found with current implementations of the Trusted Computing Group's "Static Root of Trust for Measurement." He has presented this research at NoSuchCon, Black Hat USA, SecTor, SEC-T, Breakpoint, and Ruxcon. Following this he has created a tool called Copernicus designed to determine just how prevalent vulnerable BIOS is in industry. John is currently continuing to research the security of BIOS/UEFI and the Intel architecture.
